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I’d like to thank Mark Denil for his thoughtful response to my article 
“Map Art.”1 The article, and the catalogue of 218 map artists that accom-
panied it, indeed all of the articles in what was essentially a special issue 
of Cartographic Perspectives devoted to map art, were necessarily prelimi-
nary forays into what is still largely a terra incognita.2 All were offered in 
the full expectation of being, at the very least, amended. Omissions, for 
example, were egregious. Not only did I fail to include in the catalogue 
Andy Warhol, whose map of missiles in the USSR is fast becoming an 
iconic exemplar of map art,3 but through sheer inadvertence our own 
Steve Holloway, whose map art has long since graced the cover of Carto-
graphic Perspectives.4 Such lapses should be made good once the catalogue 
goes online as a wiki, but the wiki will not address the conceptual prob-
lems Denil highlighted. The following remarks, therefore, are intended to 
clarify what I have been claiming makes a map a map, that is, what I’ve 
been calling the map’s mask.
The map’s mask establishes its alienation
Denil agrees with me that all maps wear this mask. “This, at least,” Denil 
says, “is uncontroversial: the mask refers to the signs employed by a map 
to connote trustworthiness.” That, however, is pretty much the extent of 
our agreement, because for me – to put the matter as inflammatorily as 
I can – by proclaiming its own trustworthiness the map establishes its 
alienation. Any discourse proclaiming its own trustworthiness is alienated 
discourse, what Roland Barthes called myth.5 That the map was a kind of 
myth, in Barthes’ sense, was what John Fels and I had demonstrated in 
our 1986 Cartographica paper, “Designs on Signs: Myth and Meaning in 
Maps,” where we isolated the codes chiefly responsible.6 Six years later I 
called the product of these codes “the mask no map goes without” in the 
lecture “How Maps Work” with which I inaugurated The Power of Maps 
exhibition I’d co-curated for the Cooper-Hewitt National Museum of De-
sign.7 Shortly thereafter, in “What Makes a Map a Map,” a lecture I read at 
the Yale-Smithsonian Material Culture Seminar on Maps, I distinguished 
a class of map-related objects that had not put on the mask, were not alien-
ated, and therefore not maps.8 This class included experimental and other 
sketch maps.
In doing so I characterized an essential property of maps: their object-
ness, their objectiveness, their “objectivity.”9 This “objectivity” was estab-
lished in the world of interpersonal discourse – in talk, in conversation 
– whenever a communication was “sealed” as being “in the world” by 
various forms of interpersonal validation, especially by signs of assent: nods, 
repetitions, significant glances. In this interpersonal world such discourse 
was not necessarily alienated. But in the transpersonal world where maps 
as more or less permanent, transmissible descriptions of territorial rela-
tions find their peculiar utility, such discourse was necessarily alienated 
because the quality of being in the world (of being objective) was asserted 
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not only without assent being granted (or even negotiated), but as though 
assent had been granted, that is, as though there were nothing problematic 
about the communication.
For me this problem of “objectivity” had first become acute in 1970-71 
when I was struggling to make sense of the three hundred-some experi-
mental sketch maps I’d collected for my dissertation from American teen-
agers on their first visits to London, Rome, and Paris.10 The goal was to 
learn something about how environmental knowledge changed over time, 
so in each city I’d collected sketch maps early in the kids’ visit, toward its 
middle, and near its end. The question, of course, was how to measure 
the changes. Kevin Lynch, who’d pioneered the analysis of experimental 
sketch maps, rejected the idea of comparing such “subjective” images to 
“objective” data:
To compare with these subjective pictures of the city, such data as air 
photos, maps, and diagrams of density, use, or building shape might 
seem to be the proper “objective” description of the physical form of 
the city. Considerations of their objectivity aside, such things are entire-
ly inadequate for the purpose, being both too superficial and yet not 
generalized enough. The variety of factors which might be evaluated 
is infinite, and it was found that the best comparisons to the interviews 
was the record of another subjective response, but in this case a system-
atic and observant one … While it was clear that the interviewees were 
responding to a common physical reality, the best way to define that 
reality was not through any quantitative, “factual” method but through 
the perception and evaluation of a few field observers.11
Lacking such field observers, I compared my sketch maps both to each 
other and to an arbitrarily selected standard,12 arbitrarily selected because, 
unlike Lynch, I as a geosopher could not put consideration of the objectiv-
ity of air photos, maps, and diagrams aside.13 Indeed the question lay at 
the heart of my dissertation, in which I was to conclude that all maps were 
mental maps, that is, “subjective” to one degree or another.14
The logic here was straight-forward. Among other things that Lynch’s 
“proper ‘objective’ descriptions” could have referred to were state-of-the-
art maps, but an introduction to the history of cartography had made it 
plain that over time state-of-the-art maps varied even more wildly than 
my sketch maps did. All maps varied, all the ones in people’s individual 
and collective heads, and all the ones on paper. None “reflected” the 
“real” world. Apparently “factuality” was a state of mind. But if it was, 
then all maps were mental maps. I summarized this in a diagram that dis-
tinguished internal and external states of individual, consensual, and stan-
dard maps (Figure 1). No examples of “internal maps” can be displayed, 
if such maps even exist, which today I’m inclined to doubt. Whatever the 
form of the world in our heads, it is unlikely to take that of a map.15 But 
Figure 2 displays a couple of individual sketch maps, and Figure 3 a pair 
of contrasting consensual maps. Consensual maps are shared by groups 
of like-minded, fellow-thinking people but are contested by others. Other 
consensual maps include those of contested voting districts, contested 
land claims, and the full range of counter maps. Standard maps exist in an 
abundance too great to even estimate: they’re the maps you download at 
Google Maps, buy at gas stations, and consult in the atlas at the library.
In retrospect this scheme was breathtakingly naïve but I had yet to 
tumble to the idea of social construction.16 Indeed it wouldn’t be until 1979 
that Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar would publish Laboratory Life: The 
Social Construction of Scientific Facts; and more than twenty years before I’d 
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Figure 1. This is Fig. 2.0 from my dissertation, I Don’t Want To But I Will, as published by the Clark 
University Cartographic Laboratory in 1973.
pick up Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump 
and really awake to the potential of the sociology of scientific knowledge 
for theorizing the standard map as a form of socially constructed geo-
graphic facts.17 In the meantime I remained puzzled by what it could be, if 
not correspondence to the world, that compelled acceptance of the stan-
dard map.
To this puzzle Roland Barthes offered a couple of solutions. The first 
was his notion that there were forms of speech, that he called myths, that 
denied that they were forms of speech, and which therefore insisted on 
being taken … as facts of the world. Invariably these “facts” made the status 
quo out as natural, and therefore inevitable (this was Barthes famous 
naturalization of the cultural), and it struck me immediately that the stan-
dard map was just such a myth.18 Barthes’ analysis of myth turned on his 
semiotics, and semiotics turned out to be tailor-made for maps.19 John Fels 
brought the semiotics of Umberto Eco and Algirdas Greimas to the table,20 
and together Fels and I were able to identify ten codes that either the map 
exploited or by means of which it was exploited (Figure 4).21
Although Fels and I didn’t use the term “mask,” our description of the 
actions of the presentational and rhetorical codes foreshadowed its use: 
we referred to Geological Survey topo quads as “dressing in the style of 
Science” as other maps “will dress in the style of Art. Or in the style of the 
Advertisement. Or in the Vernacular.” “The rhetorical code,” we wrote, 
“appropriates to the map the style most advantageous to the myth it in-
tends to propagate.”22 It was when recapitulating this argument in “How 
Maps Work” that I concluded that it was through the presentational code 
“that the essential mask is donned, here that the map declares its impar-
tiality, its neutrality, its objectivity.”23 That is, it was with the presentational 
code that the map insisted on being accepted not as a discourse about the 
world (which would be open to discussion, or a fight) but as the world 
itself (about which we could do nothing, which we could only accept), this 
is to say, as myth.
“. . . the map insisted on
being accepted not as a
discourse about the world 
(which would be open to
discussion, or a fight) but as the 
world . . .”
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Figure 2. Here are a couple of sketch maps. Top is a sketch spontaneously made in 1993 by a secu-
rity guard at Duke University to help us get to an auto repair shop in Durham. Below is a sketch of 
London I solicited from Janine Eber in the course of my dissertation research in 1970. I discuss the 
security guard’s map in Denis Wood, Ward Kaiser, and Bob Abramms’ Seeing Through Maps: 
Many Ways to See the World (ODT, Amherst, 2006, pp. 2-4); and Janine’s map in Denis Wood and 
Robert Beck’s “Janine Eber Maps London: Individual Dimensions of Cognitive Imagery” (Journal of 
Environmental Psychology 9, 1989, pp. 1-26).
Sealing the map’s objectivity
Thus, by then I was able to see that the map insisted on being accepted, but 
not why it was accepted. That didn’t happen until I started thinking about 
how people give and receive directions. “Think about what happens when 
you’re stopped for directions,” I asked in “What Makes a Map a Map”:
First you listen carefully to make sure you not only know the destina-
tion being sought but understand the problems involved in getting 
there. Then you say, “Sure, you turn left at the light, you go straight up 
the hill, and you’ll see it at the top on your left,” looking, as you say 
this, to your auditor for his or her comprehension. If your words don’t 
“take,” you try again. Ultimately you get the assent you need, the eager 
repetition, you make your confirmation, you get the satisfied nod, the 
thanks, and the satisfaction of watching the car make the appropriate 
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Figure 3. Here is a pair of contrasting consensual maps, showing the Pakistan-India-Kashmir region 
from, at left, an Indian perspective, and at right, a Pakistani perspective. John Krygier and I used these 
in our comic book, Ce n’est pas le monde, that we presented last year to the 13th Annual Mini-Con-
ference on Critical Geography in Columbus and at the NACIS annual meeting in Madison.
turn. But until the other has assented, your directions have not become 
objective (they have not become objects in the world), they are still 
too caught up in the personal (they are still too idiosyncratic to make 
much sense to the other); but in the interpersonal situation, the two of 
you keep trying until the directions ... make mutual sense. It is only after 
the driver (the other) has accepted the directions as sufficiently in the 
world – that is, has sealed with his nod their objectness (their objectiv-
ity) – that he will act on them. Does this sealing assure their accuracy? 
Not in the slightest. All of us give and take wrong directions all the 
time. The sealing only assures the status of the directions as objects, that 
is, as objective, in the world.24
In the transpersonal world where maps as more or less permanent, 
transmissible descriptions of territorial relations find their peculiar utility, 
this form of validation is unlikely if not inconceivable. Where mapmak-
ers have not been smeared into institutional facelessness, or raveled into 
complicated layerings of multiple authorship, they live in another city or 
another century.
What is it, then, about a map produced in such a way, or at such a time, 
or in such a place that compels from us the attention (and usually the as-
sent) that my auditor gave me? What is it about the assemblage of marks 
that ... looks to us for acceptance? In fact, almost everything about the map 
looks to us for acceptance. The title – what is a title but the map’s tilted 
head asking, “Get it? This is Asia ...” – legend box, map image, text, illustra-
tions, insets, scales, instructions, charts, apologies, diagrams, photos, ex-
planations, arrows, decorations, color scheme, type faces, all are so many 
assurances, so many signs (of gesture, eyes, cheek color, posture), chosen, 
layered, structured, to frame a discourse, to achieve winning speech.25 But 
as Fels and I had pointed out years earlier, the code works beyond these 
self-evident schemes of organization. The presentational code acts on the 
map as a whole, at every level. The mask covers more than the forehead, it 
infects everything, it determines the costumes, poses the body, picks the 
party. In the transpersonal universe, the mask is the unavoidable pres-
ence that at once permits the map to stand apart from the unknown heads 
and hands that brought it into being, but also that tells it how to do this. 
Without the mask the map collapses into a jumble of marks (it is not even 
a sketch), it is crumpled up, thrown away (the directions are ignored). This 
“. . . almost everything about 
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Figure 4. John Fels and I saw the map as a focusing device between the domains of extra- and intra-
significance: the map gathers up the constituent signs governed by the codes of intra-signification so 
that they will be able to act as signifiers in the sign-functions governed by the codes of extra-significa-
tion, which specified them in the first place. We first discussed these codes in our paper, “Designs on 
Signs: Myth and Meaning in Maps” (Cartographica 23 (4), 1986, pp. 54-103).
is the mask no map goes without. This is the mask that seals the map, that 
provides the transpersonal validation that ensures the map’s … objectivity 
(that is, its independence as an object in the world).
The mask seals the map in the transpersonal world
If we return, then, to the typology of maps I’d worked out for my dis-
sertation twenty years earlier (Figure 1), we can see that only the external 
standard map unambiguously “stands apart from the heads and hands 
that brought it into being.” The rest of the types are necessarily, essen-
tially, or more or less stuck, either in the heads, or to the heads and hands 
responsible for them. This is self-evidently true of the internal maps. But it 
is hardly less true of external individual mental maps. In fact it is precisely 
the subjectivity of experimental sketch maps that we value, the only reason we 
solicit them. And it is more or less true of external consensual maps, more 
true as they are perceived to be “self-interested and biased” (that is, at-
tached to their creators), and less true as the perception of their “objectiv-
ity” increases (of course the mask changes correspondingly). To put this in 
other words, only the external standard map wears the mask that no map 
goes without, and only the external standard map is what we are used to 
calling a map.
Nor can the mask be put on after the fact. This is because the mask is 
not merely, or even especially, the neat-line, legend, title, scale, and so 
on, but the way all of the marks – all of them together – have been orches-
trated to achieve the map’s appearance of independence, of being free of 
any maker, of being objective (and so mythic). For this reason neither an 
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experimental sketch map nor a sketch map made in the throes of conver-
sation (dependent on speech for its sealing) can wear the mask, and an 
attempt to put it on only produces the grotesque (Figures 5). To wear the 
mask the map would have to be redrawn from the beginning with the 
mask in mind.
Let me try to recapitulate the main points of this messy argument (I 
make no apologies: it’s hard going). First, I’m arguing that maps are a 
discourse function of the type Barthes termed myth, that is, maps are 
images of the world that proclaim their objective neutrality, an important 
source of their authority.26 Secondly, I’m arguing that the proclamation of 
their objective neutrality is sealed by an orchestration of marks carried out 
under the presentational and rhetorical codes, and I’ve called this orches-
tration “the mask no map goes without.” Thirdly, I’m concluding, because 
they do not proclaim their objective neutrality (if anything, quite the con-
trary), that neither experimentally generated sketch maps nor sketch maps 
in general are maps. Not only do I feel that this conclusion is warranted, 
but I’m confident that the historical record supports it. People save maps. 
They take care of them, they horde them, they catalogue them, they pile 
them up in libraries. People throw sketch maps away. Of the huge num-
ber we might imagine has been made – that so many authors are so fond 
of describing being sketched in sand and snow and on scraps of paper 
– almost none remains. Those that haven’t been blown away by the wind 
have been tossed in the waste basket.
And why not? The effort to orchestrate the marks required to proclaim 
a map’s objective neutrality is a demanding one. Because of this, maps 
are repositories of immense loads of horded knowledge, energy, ingenu-
ity, craft, and labor. Consequently maps are precious. People everywhere 
recognize this and cherish maps because of it. Sketch maps embody little 
if any of this load and are therefore comparatively worthless. People 
everywhere recognize this too, and because they do, they throw sketch 
maps away. But the difference in value is epiphenomenal. It’s their atti-
tude that ultimately sets them apart. The sketch map comes into the world 
naked, “subjective” and expressive. The map comes masked, “objective” 
and mythic. “Myth,” Barthes reminds us, “is always language robbery,” 
stealing the ostensible subject of a map to naturalize through it something 
else, as the North Carolina highway map naturalized the state through its 
apparent interest in roads.27 All primary expression can fall prey to myth, 
Barthes argued: “Nothing can be safe from myth. Myth can develop its 
second-order schema from any meaning.”28
How map art takes the mask off
While no meaning can resist capture, it is possible to turn the table. 
Barthes suggested that “The best weapon against myth is perhaps to 
mythify it in its turn, and so to produce an artificial myth: and this recon-
stituted myth will in fact be a mythology. Since myth robs language of 
something, why not rob myth? All that is needed is to use it as the depar-
ture point for a third semiological chain, to take its signification as the first 
term of a second myth.”29 Since mythologies highlight the mythic charac-
ter of myth, they rob myth of its “objectivity,” that is, of its claim to repre-
sent the world: mythology peels off the mask of myth.30 This is precisely the 
tack most commonly taken by artists working with maps.
It may be useful here to look again at the one art map Denil selected 
from the many I mentioned, The World at the Time of the Surrealists.31 While 
I noted in a footnote that the artist of this widely reproduced map is un-
known, it is actually not impossible to hazard a guess that it was the poet 
“The sketch map comes into the 
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Figure 5. At the top is a sketch of Neal’s yard that Kelly spontaneously made to help me understand 
a game he and Neal had invented. Its independence was sealed by things we said to each other as he 
sketched, and by looks and gestures. Below, his sketch tries to put the mask on after the fact. It’s merely 
grotesque. The sketch is the subject of my paper, “What Makes a Map a Map” (Cartographica 30 
(2&3), 1993, pp. 81-86).
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Paul Eluard. At the time Eluard was the managing editor of Le Surréalisme 
au Service de la Révolution for whose pages the map had been originally in-
tended, along with the rest of the contents of the issue of Variétes in which 
the map finally appeared; and, in fact, together with André Breton and 
Louis Aragon, Eluard edited this special issue of Variétes. Circumnavigat-
ing the globe in 1924, Eluard, joined by his wife Gala and Max Ernst, had 
spent time in Southeast Asia and the East Indies where he had been pow-
erfully affected by the horrors of Dutch and French colonialism. Eluard re-
corded his route on a map, Les Cinq Parties du Monde, Planisphère, Compre-
nant toutes les Possessions Coloniales, a classic of the era that displayed on a 
Mercator projection, English possessions in yellow, French in pink, Dutch 
in orange, Italian in mauve, and so on.32 This map must have presented 
an irresistible target to the increasingly anti-colonial Eluard who closely 
anticipated Barthes’ method for mythologizing a myth: Eluard traced 
over the mythic Cinq Parties with its “toutes les Possessions Coloniales” and 
used it as the departure for a third semiological chain that erased not only 
(as is usually noted) the United States but most of Europe (of France only 
Paris survives); that radically increased the size of the South Sea islands 
that Eluard believed most capable of breaking the European hegemony; 
and that replaced the old equator with one that approximated the route of 
Eluard’s circumnavigation. Personalized, Surrealized, the world map of 
colonial possessions had its pretense of representing the world stripped 
from it. Its status as myth had been made clear. The mask had been pulled 
from its face.
Where experimental and other sketch maps fail to put the mask on, 
most art maps strip it off.33 Denil’s presumption that he and artists like Elu-
ard make maps the same way is like saying that they both use their hands 
to do so. It’s true, but gormless. It ignores the towering divide between 
their attitudes toward the world. As Denil himself fully acknowledges, the 
maps Denil makes as a professional cartographer are as fully masked as 
the colonialist map that Eluard unmasked. I’m looking at the maps of the 
Vilcabamba-Amboro Conservation Megacorridor, Current Status, and Ten-Year 
Outcomes that Denil made as a cartographer for Conservation Internation-
al.34 These maps have fully exploited the potential of the presentational 
code to connote trustworthiness, and I have no doubt that they are the 
hard-won results of painstaking efforts at marshalling the best and most 
relevant data that can be brought to bear in the most powerful way on 
how best to mitigate threats to biodiversity in the region and the world.35 
Trust, however, was hardly an appeal Eluard would have been likely to 
make. Trustworthiness was never a value of interest to Surrealism. If any-
thing, one would imagine the contrary to have been the case, that Eluard 
and his collaborators hoped first to have encouraged a kind of vertigo in 
anyone contemplating their map, a disorientation, a puzzlement, perhaps 
a dawning wonder. “We believe in a new underground counter culture,” 
Werner Spies quotes a Surrealist declaration with reference to this map, 
one “that will disrupt History and break the ludicrous grip of Fact.”36 No, 
it is hard to imagine the Surrealists exploiting the presentational code to 
connote trustworthiness or, for that matter, any other detested bourgeois 
value.
Nor would trustworthiness seem to have been much on the mind of 
Mona Hatoum, whose 2003 Map I also discussed. Composed of a ton-
and-a-half of clear glass marbles spread across a slick concrete floor, Map 
would seem almost the embodiment of untrustworthiness, not only shape-
shifting with every change of light, but threatening to send flying anyone 
who would dare to step on it. Like Eluard, the Palestinian Hatoum – born 
to a people without a country – takes a mythic map as a point of departure 
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for a third semiological chain which, as mythology, strips the myth from 
the map of the world and holds it up to ask whether it is a one we want to 
live by.37 Although art maps do not enter the world naked as sketch maps 
do, neither do they enter it masked as maps. Rather they come with masks 
in hand, masks pulled from the face of maps they’ve unmasked. In so 
doing they join sketch maps on the same side of the great divide. On their 
side, open speech, claiming no more for itself than to be spoken. On the 
other, alienated speech proclaiming its trustworthiness and demanding to 
be taken as true.
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Erik Jonsson puts it in his Inner Navigation (Scribner, New York, 2002): 
“Part of the trouble we have when we try to look at our cognitive map 
comes from the ‘map’ label, which is misleading. For our cognitive 
map is not a map: it does not look at all like a map. It would be better 
to call it our ‘awareness of our familiar environment’” (p. 27). 
16 See Ian Hacking’s wonderful The Social Construction of What? (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1999) for an overview.
17 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, 
Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1985). Their description of Boyle’s program for establishing matters 
of fact through the social construction of assent, and the material, 
literary, and social technologies Boyle mobilized to do so (including 
the social construction of the open laboratory, the development of a 
self-consciously modest and functional style of writing, and the control 
of forms of discourse) are utterly convincing. Only the substitution of 
a few terms are required to turn their book into one about the social 
construction of geographic facts.
18 That maps worked to naturalize the status quo explained why maps 
changed over time, not due to any sort of “progress,” but because the 
status quo was continually evolving.
19 Barthes’ “Myth Today,” was seminal, but his Elements of Semiology (Hill 
and Wang, New York, 1967 [1964]), S/Z (Hill and Wang, New York, 
1974 [1970]), and The Fashion System (Hill and Wang, New York, 1983 
[1967]) were also essential. 
     
                                5 cartographic perspectives    Number 56,  Winter 2007
20 Critical here was Eco’s A Theory of Semiotics (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1976). Greimas’ writings were finally collected in On 
Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory (University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1987 [1970-83]).
21 Wood and Fels, op. cit.
22 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
23 It’s worth noting that “How Maps Work” opened with a list of various 
masks worn by different maps. It concluded with, “Each map wears 
its mask, yet beneath them all lies still another, the mask no map goes 
without” (p. 66).
24 “What Makes a Map a Map,” op. cit., p. 82. Note that this idea of 
“objectivity” carries no burden of correspondence theory, nor is it 
concerned with bias or disinterestedness. Its sole concern is the object-
status of the thing in the world. Jack Goody writes about this kind of 
objectivity as a general property of writing: “Writing puts a distance 
between man and his verbal acts. He can now examine what he says in 
a more objective manner” (in Goody’s The Domestication of the Savage 
Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. 150). More 
recently David Turnbull has recast Goody’s argument in an histori-
cally more subtle form in a discussion of Pacific navigation traditions 
(in Turnbull’s Masons, Tricksters, and Cartographers, Routledge, London, 
2000, pp. 151-153). This kind of objectivity is not quite, but close to, 
what Allan Megill writes about as “the dialectical sense of objectiv-
ity” in his “Four Senses of Objectivity;” that Johannes Fabian writes 
about as “ethnographic objectivity” in his “Ethnographic Objectivity 
Revisited: From Rigor to Vigor;” and that Andy Pickering describes 
in his “Objectivity and the Mangle of Practice,” all three in the collec-
tion Megill edited called Rethinking Objectivity (Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1994).
25 Fels and I, in a text in press (The Natures of Maps: Cartographic Construc-
tions of the Natural World, ESRI Press, Redlands, 2007) identify these 
aspects as the paramap, a term we’ve adopted from Gérard Genette’s 
work on the paratext. See his Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997 [1987]).
26 The essential authority remains the police power of the state.
27 The Barthes quote comes from his “Myth Today,” op. cit., p. 131. In 
our forthcoming  text, op. cit., Fels and I examine the naturalization of 
culture through the apparent interest of many maps in, among other 
things, earthquakes, ecosystems, the earth seen from space, parks, the 
range of pin oak trees, and so on.
28 “Myth Today,” op. cit., p. 131.
29 Ibid., p. 135. 
30 As I explained in my map art paper, this is most often made evident 
by the elimination of the phatic signage commonly associated with 
maps, though the opposite tack can be taken too and the signage can 
be exaggerated. The extreme here would be all phatic signage, none 
under the control of the topic or temporal codes, as in Lewis Carroll’s 
well-known Ocean-Chart from The Hunting of the Snark.
31 Le monde au temps des Surréalists, published as a double-page spread in 
a special issue, Le Surréalisme en 1929, of the Brussels journal, Variétes, 
June 1929, pp. 26-27. This issue of Variétes was reprinted in 1994 in the 
Collection Fac-Similé from Didier Devillez Editeur, Brussels. Inci-
dentally, in my original “Map Art” piece I claimed that the map was 
published without a neatline, as indeed Patrick Waldberg reproduced 
it in his Surrealism (Thames and Hudson, London, 1965, p. 24) and I 
reproduced it in The Power of Maps (Guilford, New York, 1992, p. 183). 
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This was an error. The map very much had a neatline in Variétes.
32 This map, Les Cinq Parties du Monde, Planisphère, Comprenant toutes 
les Possessions Coloniales, A Taride Editeur, 18-20 Boulevard St. Denis, 
Paris, with Eluard’s route marked by himself in ink, is currently in 
the possession of the Musée d’art et d’historie, in Saint-Denis (Paris). 
While the conclusion that Eluard may have authored Le monde au temps 
des Surréalists is mine, the grounds for thinking so lie in the story put 
together by Robert McNab in his Ghost Ships: A Surrealist Love Triangle 
(Yale University press, New Haven, 2004). McNab reproduces Les Cinq 
Parties on p. 58, and Le monde au temps des Surréalists on p. 211, once 
again without the neatline.
33 Some art maps don’t put the mask on. In fact map artists exploit a 
range of strategies, but none results in the mythic discourse character-
istic of a map.
34 These can be found in ESRI Map Book Vol. 17: Geography and GIS 
– Sustaining Our World, ESRI Press, Redlands, 2002, p. 25. Details of the 
maps are online at www.esri.com/mapmuseum/mapbook_gallery/
volume17/conservation12.html.
35 What Denil’s maps naturalize is an idea of nature under threat. Fels 
and I devote a chapter to an analysis of this myth (in our text in press, 
op. cit.), which we see as one of eight different “natures” maps have 
helped to construct.
36 In his “Preface” to McNab’s Ghost Ships, op. cit., p. ix. Spies is the 
world’s reigning expert on Ernst.
37 In particular Hatoum’s map strips away the pretense of institutional 
stability, the establishment of which is the principal goal of, among 
others, national mapping agencies.
